The Endowment Effect: Rose-Tinted and DarkTinted Glasses
DHANANJAY NAYAKANKUPPAM HIMANSHU MISHRA* The endowment effect, predicted by prospect theory, is a robust finding in behavioral decision theory. Extending recent examinations of the underlying processes, we present evidence for differential perceptions of the traded item, with sellers focusing more on positive features and less on negative features, relative to buyers. In experiment 1, sellers and buyers access information of differing valence in a free recall task. Experiment 2 utilizes error rates and response latencies to demonstrate systematic, and differing, patterns of errors and biases in reactions to valenced stimuli. Experiment 3 utilizes contrast effects to manipulate these foci, thereby moderating the endowment effect.
S tudies examining individual decision making have revealed an asymmetric pattern in responding to potential gains or losses (loss aversion), measured relative to an individual's initial status quo position (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . One consequence of such a response function is that sellers tend to overvalue objects relative to buyers. For example, Heberlein and Bishop (1985) found that people were willing to pay $31 for a hunting permit but were not willing to sell it for less than $143. Thaler (1980) called this pattern-demanding more to give up an item than one would pay to acquire it-the endowment effect.
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(i.e., the money and the item respectively) and find support for this in that selling prices were affected by variables mapping onto changes in aspects of possession, while buying prices were affected by variables mapping onto changes in aspects of expenditure. Thus, they argue that the endowment effect does not merely reflect a greater hedonic impact of that which is lost but biased information integration.
We extend this line of research by examining how buyers and sellers perceive the item. Specifically, the results of Carmon and Ariely (2000) could result from one of two, or both, processes. One is that traders perceive the item as possessing similar features, be those positive or negative, but there is a presumably motivated bias in weighting the evaluative implications of different attributes. Sellers might argue that the positive features provide excellent evaluative connotations and the negative features are merely minor annoyances, while buyers extract a punitive evaluative penalty for the negative features. Thus, the item is perceived similarly, but there is a difference in the weight given to different features in forming an evaluation. The second explanation is that buyers and sellers perceive the same item in fundamentally different ways-they focus on different features. We seek evidence that the latter indeed occurs-that sellers and buyers focus on features of differing valence. Such evidence would also provide further support for the biased-information-integration account (Carmon and Ariely 2000) .
Much prior work supports the plausibility of such differential foci on features (Houston and Sherman 1995; Houston, Sherman, and Baker 1989; Shafir 1993) . For example, Shafir (1993) has demonstrated reliance on negative features in reject decisions and on positive features in accept decisions. An enriched option that contains more positive as well as negative features, compared to an impoverished option, can thus be both more and less preferred, depending upon the type of decision. We suggest a similar phenomenon in the context of trading an item. A buyer, giving up money to obtain the item, presumably brings features of the item to mind, be those positive or negative, and reaches an evaluation based on these features. A seller, however, standing to lose the item and gain the money, would examine benefits of ownership being given up and want compensation for the same. Note that benefits indicate positive features-since one does not normally speak of being compensated for giving up negative features, we suggest these negative features are unlikely to come to mind. To summarize, we hypothesize an overrepresentation of the positive features of the item being traded and an underrepresentation of the negative features, by sellers, relative to buyers. This was tested across three experiments that are reported herewith.
EXPERIMENT 1
The main objective of this experiment was to examine whether buyers and sellers had a differential access to valenced features of the object being traded. Given our conceptualization, we anticipated that in a free recall task, sellers would demonstrate a bias for positive features, and against negative features, of the item being traded.
Method
Two hundred and twenty-one participants took part in the experiment for partial course credit and were given a pen to fill out a series of booklets. The last booklet assigned them to be buyers or sellers of the pen and asked them to quote their reservation prices. All participants also listed six thoughts about the pen and coded each thought for valence (i.e., positive, negative, or neutral). The order of quoting a price and doing the thought listing was counterbalanced, resulting in a 2 (role: seller vs.
(order: thoughtsbuyer) # 2 price vs. price-thoughts) between-participants design.
Results
The order condition did not influence or interact with any of the other variables ( ). Consistent with the en-
A repeated measures analysis examining the number of positive, negative, and neutral thoughts yielded a role # interaction, , . 
Discussion
The results provide preliminary support for systematic differences in the accessibility to valenced information in the minds of buyers and sellers. Note, however, the free recall nature of the task. Free recall is a relatively controlled response, and respondents can screen or edit naturally occurring thoughts and responses. For instance, a reason-based account would suggest that sellers generate reasons to support a selling price and vice versa. While this should have revealed itself through the order condition, we acknowledge the limitations of such verbal protocols. To address these issues, we conducted experiment 2 utilizing response latencies.
EXPERIMENT 2 Bassili (1996) has distinguished between metacognitive (like the measures used in experiment 1) and operational measures in assessing process issues. Operational measures, in contrast to metacognitive measures, provide a relatively nonreactive means to assess the strength of association among concepts. The response latency associated with responses is one such measure that can be utilized to examine the accessibility and associations between concepts.
In the first phase of the experiment, participants were endowed (or not) with coffee mugs having a university logo, exposed to positive and negative attributes of the mug, and asked for their reservation prices. In the second phase, we utilized probes to examine memory traces and information structure (Anderson 1983; Anderson and Bower 1973) . Participants saw the features they had seen earlier, but either in true (targets) or in false (foils) form, and were asked to 
PATTERNS OF ERRORS MADE BY BUYERS AND SELLERS ACROSS POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FEATURES, EXPERIMENT 2
make true/false judgments. Response latencies and error rates served as dependent measures. We hypothesized that there should emerge systematic errors and biases between sellers and buyers. Specifically, we predicted that sellers would be more likely to make errors on negative features and less likely to make errors on positive features, compared to buyers. In other words, we predicted a interaction on errors. We also prerole # valence dicted that sellers would be hindered (longer latencies) to a greater degree than buyers by positive foils compared to positive targets. This would result from a positive foil (that looks like a negative feature) requiring sellers to access a poorly encoded structure that is unlikely to be naturally focused on, while positive targets would entail accessing a well-encoded structure. We also expected sellers, compared to buyers, to be facilitated by negative foils compared to negative targets. Denying the existence of some positive feature (required by false negatives) would be easier in the light of other accessible positive features, while affirming true negatives would require accessing poorly encoded structures and presumably be affectively unpleasant. Thus, we predicted a interaction on the role # valence # truth latencies.
Method
Eighty-eight students took part in the experiment for partial course credit. Participants were seated at a computer, next to which was a coffee mug, and were informed that they either owned the mug or did not. Participants in both conditions, before quoting buying/selling price, were shown four features of the mug (two positive and two negative). The attributes shown were the following: (1) It has a convenient open/close spout to prevent spills, (2) the mug can break from impact-it is not unbreakable, (3) it is dishwasher safe, and (4) it is not microwaveable.
Subsequently, participants provided their reservation prices. This was followed by unrelated experimental material to provide a temporal delay and clear working memory contents. Participants were then told that attributes of the mug would appear on the computer screen and their task was to press appropriate keys to indicate whether the statements were true or false. The four probes appeared one by one, in either true (targets) or false form (foils). Participants' responses and response times served as dependent variables. The experiment was thus a 2 (role: buyer vs. 2 seller) # (valence: positive vs.
(truth: true vs. false) negative) # 2 design, with the first and third factor varied between participants and the second factor within participant.
Results
Buying/Selling Prices. The basic endowment effect emerged with sellers quoting significantly higher reservation prices ($5.59) than buyers, ($4.43 Figure 3 graphs the difference between the response latency to foils as compared to targets across valence for buyers and sellers. Positive values indicate hindrance (i.e., response to foil longer than response to the target) and negative values represent facilitation (i.e., response to the foil shorter than response to the target).
Consistent with an overrepresentation of positive features and underrepresentation of negative features, it was easier for sellers to acknowledge the existence of positive features than to deny the lack of the same. It was also easier to deny a false negative feature (a positive feature that they had not seen earlier) than to acknowledge a true negative.
Discussion
In conjunction, the error analyses and the latency analyses converge on demonstrating systematic and differing patterns of errors and biases in reactions to valenced stimuli by buyers and sellers, supporting the notion of differing perceptions of the same item in the minds of buyers and sellers. Sellers appear to have a better representation of positive features and a worse representation of negative features, compared to buyers. Note that these results also rule out more motivated or reason-based accounts that experiment 1 is susceptible to. It is implausible that participants would commit errors to support their reservation prices, and it is particularly implausible that they would, or could, exercise control over their response times.
EXPERIMENT 3
The first two experiments have provided process data suggesting a tendency on the part of sellers to focus on and overrepresent positive features and to ignore and underrepresent negative features of an item, relative to buyers. Manipulating these foci of traders, by forcing them to attend to features not automatically attended to, should then moderate the endowment effect. The goal of experiment 3 was to provide such evidence.
Method
One hundred and eighty-eight participants took part in the experiment for partial course credit. Participants were provided with pens. Some of the participants were provided with two pens, one of which was markedly better than the other (the comparison group), while some of the participants saw only one of the two pens (the control group). Participants who saw both pens were either made buyers or sellers of one of the pens. All participants provided their reservation prices. The design of the experiment was thus a 2 (role: buyer vs.
(group: control vs. 2 seller) # 2 comparison) # (type of pen: better vs. lesser) between-participants design.
Participants who saw both pens would experience a contrast effect (Schwarz and Bless 1992) . Specifically, seeing a good pen in comparison to a lesser pen would force attention on the positive features of the good pen and the negative features of the lesser pen. Given that sellers normally focus on positive aspects of their possessions, drawing their attention to positive aspects (getting the seller of the better pen to compare it to the lesser pen) should not change their reservation price (since they automatically focus on those aspects), but forcing their attention to negative aspects (the seller of the lesser pen comparing it to the better pen) should change their reservation price (since they do not normally focus on those aspects). Thus, we predicted that the better pen's sellers would not raise their selling price, but the lesser pen's sellers would depress their selling price. In contrast, we predicted an opposite pattern for buyers who do not encode positive features as heavily as sellers do. Drawing their attention to positive features should result in significant increases in their buying prices (since these are not normally well represented), but drawing their attention to the negative features (which are already well represented) should not depress buying prices. Thus, buyers of the better pen would be more likely to increase their buying price whereas buyers of the lesser pen would not reduce their buying prices.
In summary, we predicted that selling prices for the better pen would not be influenced by the comparison but selling prices for the lesser pen would. In contrast, buying prices for the lesser pen would not be affected by the comparison but buying prices for the better pen would. The control group provided baseline estimates for the endowment effect.
Results
Lower Figure 4 graphs the results.
Discussion
The goal of experiment 3 was to provide evidence that forcing sellers to pay attention to negative features and buyers to pay attention to positive features would moderate the endowment effect. We utilized a contrast effect to draw attention to these features. As anticipated, the endowment effect was moderated-forcing sellers to attend to positive features did not affect selling prices, while forcing them to attend to negative features lowered selling prices. Forcing buyers to attend to negative features did not affect buying prices, while forcing them to attend to positive features increased buying prices.
CONCLUSION
In conjunction, the three experiments demonstrate the existence of differing perceptions of the item being traded in the minds of buyers and sellers. Specifically, it appears that sellers, in comparison to buyers, focus on and overrepresent the positive features, and underrepresent the negative features, associated with the item. This results in reliably different reservation prices on the part of buyers and sellers, leading to the endowment effect.
It should also be noted that these results help understand prior work. For instance, Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein (2000) have documented egocentric empathy gaps between buyers and sellers. This empathy gap is not surprising given our results-buyers and sellers are bound to be surprised by prices quoted by the other, since their reservation prices reflect genuine, good-faith valuations rather than profiteering motives. The proposed mechanism also helps understand other prefactual ownership effects. For instance, Carmon, Wertenbroch, and Zeelenberg (2003) have documented that considering options closely before choice results in an increased attraction for forgone options. In a similar vein, Levin et al. (2002) demonstrate that building down from a fully loaded pizza results in more toppings than building up from an unloaded pizza. These prefactual and notional ownership effects (i.e., the forgone options, the toppings) are quite understandable and consistent with the focus on positive features of whatever is being given up. Finally, the endowment effect does appear to reflect biases in information integration, thereby providing a deeper understanding for the mental processes generating the greater hedonic impact associated with losses that is implicit in prospect theory.
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